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The Korean War as a case-study and some of its 
Implications for Western Europe - a reappraisal. 
ANDREA CAMPANA, EUI 
This essay will present and evaluate the most recent interpretations on 
the Korean War and locate this conflict in the panorama of the Cold War. 
It will mainly focus on some interesting aspects which have recently 
come to light after further research. In particular the final section will 
deal with the way in which the Korean War affected West European 
security. 
The research topics concerning Korea which have been most widely 
discussed are: 
1) North-Korea as part of the monolithic Socialist bloc, and the 
corollary of this thesis, 
revisited; 
2) Korea as a symbol of the American foreign policy; 
3) the predominantly civil origins of the war; 
4) Korea as a turning point for the global Cold War process. 
This paper will comment on all these topics leading, in the last part, 
to an analysis of the relationships between United States and Great 
Britain, which was politically the most important European ally. This 
part will be based on archival material the Public Record Office 
(PRO) and other British public and private archives. 
The Korean War (1950-1953), provoked by the invasion of the South by 
the North pro-Communist army, was soon internationalized through the 
intervention of the US army in support of the pro-western South (ROK). 
It was impossible to set up a UN peace-enforcing corp under the 
stringent rules of the United Nations Charter, because of the failure of 
the member states to agree on this topic in 1947-481. However a 
coordinated US/UN intervention, in which United Kingdom played a 
major part2, was made possible in this case (the first UN direct military 
intervention) thanks to the absence of USSR from the Security Council of 
the United Nations. The Soviet boycott- in protesting against the absence 
lE. JOHNSON, British Proposals for a United Nations Force, 1946-48, pp. 109-145, in A. DEIGHTON 
(ed) Britain and the First Cold War, London, MacMillan Press 1990; G. A. CAJ\1PANA, Un fallimento 
della diplomazia intemazionale: l'ONU e la sua forza militare, TESTIMONIANZE, n. 335-336/1991. 
2Apart from UK, other European countries present in Korea were: France, Greece, BENELUX. 
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of the newly created People's Republic of China (PRC)- was decisive for 
the veto not being cast. 
After some months of military operations, US/UN troops marched north 
of the 38th parallel, the political boundary in Korea. The arrival of US 
marines at the border with PRC provoked the Chinese intervention. 
Thus, a rebalance of the military situation was the basic precondition for 
the beginning of negotiation for a cease-fire in July 1951. The long 
dragging pour-parlers ended only two years later, in July, 1953. The 
division of the peninsula was roughly re-established according the status 
quo ante. The heavy US involvement3 had not bring out a clear victory. 
Since 1953 nothing has changed and a peace treaty has not been issued. 
For a scholar studying limited conflicts after the II World War, it is 
striking how detailed the bibliography on Korea is. It has to be noted, 
however, that the large majority of historians on this subject (as, more 
generally on the Cold War) are Americans. 
Only in the last few years have scholars from other countries, 
particularly from Great Britain - but also from Korea and Australia, 
started to furnish very interesting studies, more critical of previous 
interpretations and paving the way for a new debate. Nevertheless, very 
important questions such as the domestic situation of the peninsula, the 
possible use of nuclear devices, and especially the relations between 
allies have not been discussed deeply. 
For many years after the war, only a few orthodox works, not based on 
primary sources, were available4. By 1984 all the American documents on 
the war were consultable. And in the last ten years European archives 
have also been opened. However, many scholars refer to the fact that the 
war is still unknown. Roger Dingman has explained this fact, saying that 
Korea remained "sandwiched" between the "good war" (the one in the 
Pacific) and the "bad war" (the one in Vietnam). 
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS. 
1) North-Korea as part of the monolithic Socialist bloc, and a corollary 
of this thesis revisited. 
The question of the dubious responsibility for the outbreak of the war 
has faded. The initial and sudden attack was staged by the North koreans. 
The recurrence of the opposite interpretation in past literature derived 
from an ideological understanding of the events of the Cold War. Modern 
historiography seems to have overcome the thesis of a Southern attack, as 
well as the theory of a pro-American South that instigated the 
3In the war some two to three million civilians were killed. US/UN Command dropped 635,000 tons 
of bombs (503.000 in the whole Pacific scenario in World War I!) and 32,557 tons of napalm. R. 
FOOT, A Substitute for Victory, lthaca, Cornell University Press 1990, p. 208. 
4E.g., see D. REES, The Limited War, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964. 
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intervention of the Communist North (RDPC), in order to gain American 
supportS. 
Merrill's account (1989) of the complete - and various - interpretations 
given by the Americans (traditionalists and revisionists), by the Socialist 
historians, by the North Koreans, and even by the Chinese, is today 
definitive. This debate generally recognizes the historical fact of a 
sudden invasion operated by the Communist Northern regime6. 
Today, the centre of the debate (which will be enhanced by possible 
documentary revelation from the former Socialist side) focusses on the 
de facto relationship (political and military) between the regime of Kim 
Il Sung and that of Peking and/or Moscow. This relationship has had an 
important impact when considering the possible war by proxy often 
used by Washington as a propaganda to obtain the rearmament of 
Western Europe within the framework of NATO. 
In particular, this danger was said to be pending on West Germany (who 
was expected to join the NATO organization), less on the Scandinavian 
countries (Norway, but also Sweden and Denmark were seen as possible 
targets), on Yugoslavia and Italy, badly protected by a weak and occupied 
Austria, and by the not completely stable Balcans. 
It is stated by many authors today that Stalin was fully aware of Kim's 
intention to unify the peninsula, but what is not clear is the degree of 
approval accorded by the Soviet dictator, and whether he knew the 
timing of the Northern initiative7. Recently - December, 1990- Edvard 
Shevardnaze, at that time USSR Foreign Minister, gavP- an "official 
apology" to Roo Tae \'V'oo, the present South Korean President, for the 
Soviet role in the Korean War, remaining unclear on the precise 
responsibilities of the Russian government8 
Giving different reasons, William Stueck, John Merrill, Zhai Zhihai, Hao 
Yufan and Andrei Gromiko, in his memories9, seem to converge on the 
conclusion that Stalin was in fact aware of Kim's intention. Only a few 
authors, e.g. Cumings, continue to state that "Soviets did not have advance 
knowledge of the attack"10, 
From the Chinese point of view, their military intervention is generally 
treated sympathetically. In All en Whiting's study, Anthony Farrar-
5The limits of the revisionist arguments on this point come out clearly from the debate between 
Stueck and the Kolkos in An Exchange of Opinion, PACIFICAL HISTORICAL REVIEW, 2/1973. 
6 MERRILL, Korea. The Peninsular Origins of the \Var, Associated University Press 1989, Chapter 1. 
7c. MacDONALD Korea: The War Before Vietnam, London, MacMillan 1986 and GYE-DONG KIM, 
Who Initiated the Korean War.7, in]. COTTON e I. NEARY eds) The Korean War in History, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989, pp. 33-50. 
8Quoted in R. FOOT, Making Known the Unknown War, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, summer 1991, 
footnote n. 18. 
9
·]. MERRILL, 1989; ZHAI ZHIHAI and HAO YUFAN China's Decision to Enter the Korean War 
CHINA QUARTERLY, March 1990, pp. 100-136; A. GROMYKO, Memories, London, Hutchinson ,1989, 
pp.l31-2. 
10B. CUMINGS, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, Princeton University Press 1990, pp.636-37. 
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Hockley's article, Peng Dehuai's and Nie Rongzhen's memories, the 
deployment of the "volunteers" was considered as defensive, or else 
strictly connected with domestic preoccupations. In these works it has 
been highlighted that Mao (and General Peng Dehuai) believed inevitable 
the intervention in Korea in order to limit the excessive American power 
in the area. Even if not all the Chinese leaders seemed to feel positively 
towards this intervention, Mao Zedong thought that some possible help 
from the Soviets would be more feasible in the North East Asian region 
than elsewhere (Taiwan or Indochina) for geo-political reasonsll 
More documents from the former Soviet and Chinese archives will 
probably greatly re-assess the historiography about the effective 
relations between China and Russia during the '50s, and enabling us to 
understand to what extent and for what purposes the two Communist 
countries were (or were not) interested in the outbreak and the 
continuation of the war. 
From the Chinese point of view, we will be able to understand when the 
"Trilogy" conception - according to which the pro-Soviet third world 
idea was prominent - and when that of a "Dicotomy" - Korea as a dam to 
defend the frontiers with the corollary of a dialogue with the Americans 
-were finally accepted12 
This reassessment will also clarify the question according to which a 
decision by US/UN troops not to cross the 38th parallel before the 
Chinese intervention would have terminated the war earlierl3. 
In general we must recognize that historians have - through secondary 
sources - dismantled the thesis of a war by proxy in Korea. Thus, the 
Korean war cannot be seen as a prelude for a change of policy in 
Europe. Furthermore, work in European archives has also proved that 
high officials and politicians of the Old Continent did not believe in a 
Soviet attackl4. 
11A.S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, Standford, Standford 
University Press 1960; A. FARRAR-HOCKLEY, A Reminiscence of the Chinese People's Volunteers in 
the Korean War, CHINA QUARTERLY, June 1984, pp. 287-04; PENG DEHUAI, Memoirs of a Chinese 
Marshal: the Authobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai, Beijin, Foreign Languages Press 1984. 
Quoted in R. FOOT (DIPLOMATIC HISTORY): NIE RONGZHEN, Huiyi Lu, Beijin, PLA Publishers 
1984. 
12R. SIMMONS, The Strained Alliance, New York, Free Prees 1975; MAN HO HEO, La costance de 
i'unite nationale Coreenne: essai d'une nouvelle interpretation de la guerre de Coree, Doctoral 
thesis at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, supervisor: Prof. Alain Joxe 1988. 
Bw. STUECK, The Road to Confrontation, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press 1981, pp. 
254-55; B. KAUFMAN, The Korean War, Philadelphia, Temple University Press 1986, pp. 83-85; R. 
FOOT, The Wrong War, lthaca, Cornell University Press 1985, pp 67-74. 
14G.A. CAMPANA, 11 dilemma coreano: la Gran Bretagna fra Stati Uniti e Cina, Doctoral thesis in 
History of International Relations, Rome, supervisor: Prof Ennio Di Nolfo 1988. We refer also to 
statements made both by R. T. GRIFFITHS and W. ABELSHAUSER at a seminar at European 
University Institute (EUI), 6/2/90. 
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2) Korea as a symbol for American foreign policy. 
The US/UN intervention also poses problems of interpretation, although 
these are now based on primary sources. 
Some historians state that the commitment of the Truman administration 
to Korea in June 1950 stemmed entirely from its symbolic value. US 
credibility worldwide was at stake. Korea was of no strategic interest at 
all. 
Burton I. Kaufman noted: "After the Communist victory in China, Korea 
become the only symbol left of America's willingness to contain 
Communist expansion in Asia. Washing its hands of Korea would be a 
signal to other Asians that the United States had abandoned them as well". 
This view is reported even in an even stronger way by Charles M. Dobbs: 
"Korea mattered little for its own sake; rather the perceived requirements 
of the Cold War made it important"15. 
These scholars mention as prominent the position of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) in Washington: on some occasions the military chiefs asked 
for a removal of troops from the peninsula, and were not always 
favourable to the course chosen by MacArthur16 
Although in certain periods (between 1945 and 1948) the JCS in 
Washington believed that Korea was not a practical base for US Armed 
forces, the theory of the entirely "symbolic value of Korea" stems from 
an over idealistic approach to American policy and to international 
relations in general. Korea was presented as a symbol to the European 
All1es, but to American policy-makers - the President, his National 
Security Council (NSC) advisers, the majority of the State Department 
off1c1als, the Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command (C1NCFE) - it 
was not without real strategic significance. The withdrawal of US troops 
m 1948-49, m fact, was not due to the wish to abandon Korea to its fate 
but to tactical considerations. The defense of Korea became mor~ 
effective and less costly from US bases in Japan. 
Ronald McGlothlen underlines an important factor against the "symbolic 
value" thesis. In his article, he reveals the steady attitude of Dean 
Acheson during the period 1947-1950 and the work of many of his 
fa1thful collaborators. Acheson was very much in favour of the economic 
recovery of South Korea, defended by a military apparate. Korea would 
have to contribute - like Germany to Europe - in the creation of a 
"workshop", the "workshop of Asia". Its economic reconstruction -
which he wanted to be mentioned in the Truman Doctrine with $250 
15B.KAUFMAN 1986, pp. 23-24. C.M. DOBBS, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the 
Cold War and Korea, 1945-1950, Kent, Ohio, Kent State University Press 1981, pp. 160-192; see also 
STUECK 1981; R. BUHITE, Soviet-American Relations in Asia 1945-54, Norman University of 
Oklahoma Press 1981; J.l. MA TRAY The Reluctant Crusade, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press 
1985. 
16see, e.!'. OHN CHANG IL, The joint Chiefs of Staff and US Policy and Strategy Regarding Korea, 
Ph.D Umvers1ty of Kansas, 1983, University Microfilm International (UMI) 
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million aid - had to become the core of the economic reconstruction of a 
western oriented North East Asia in which Korea and Japan were to play 
the pivotal role. The so-called Acheson "perimeter speech" (the public 
statement in which Korea was left aside in US strategy) in January 1950 
was, in fact, a concession to his bitter rival, Secretary of Defense Louis 
Johnson, who decided to flatter the domestic opposition17. 
Domestic political pressures are often forgotten. Stephen Peltz reminds 
us of the attacks against the Truman's administration on Asian policy. In 
his words, "Truman and Acheson needed to interpret the North Korean 
attack as a part of a [Communist] global challenge". The Democratic 
administration, already strongly criticized for the "loss of China", also 
had to face heavy criticism from within the bureaucracy: Dean Rusk, 
John Foster Dulles, Douglas MacArthur, and the opposition in Congress. 
Later, after the dismissal of MacArthur, the General suceeded in shaping 
a common opinion according to which only the use of force could end 
the hostilities. 
McCarthy also, putting himself at the head of the so-called "Asia firsters", 
disturbed Truman policy, contributing to the never-ending military pour 
parlers. Although some authors (Kaufman, Reichard, Caridi), and some 
McCarthy's biographers try to reconstruct the political American 
athmosphere of these years, a work based on a complete research of 
newspapers and magazines is still lacking. The role of some lobbies 
. involved in Asian affairs, in particular the China Lobby, is today, also, 
quite obscure18 
From the international point of view, Marc Paul has persuasively 
demonstrated the importance of the "Atomic diplomacy", adopted for 
Korea by the Truman administration. He stresses the fact that Truman 
relying on the nuclear umbrella, could afford a policy of non-decisio~ 
for Korea after August 1945. Playing on the fact that they were the only 
nuclear power, the JCS could pledge for the withdrawal of troops. 
17see R. McGLOTHEN, Acheson, Economics, and the American Committment in Korea, 1947-
1950, PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW, 1989, vol. LVII, pp. 23-54. 
18S. PELTZ, US Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950, in B. CUMINGS ed) Child of Conflict, 
Seattle University of Washington Press 1983, pp. 131-175; KAUFMAN 1985; G. REI CHARD, Politics as 
Usual, Arlington, Heights, Ill, Harlan Davidson 1988; R.J. CARIDI, The Korean War and American 
Politics, Philadelphia, University of Pennsilvanya Press 1968. For the China Lobby: S.D. BACHRACK, 
The Committee of One Million, New York, Columbia University Press 1976; R. Y. KOEN, The China 
Lobby in American Politics, New York 1974. On the contrary, American public opinion during the 
war followed almost the same pattern that it followed in the Vietnam War; in the Korean case 
howevwer the loss of support was far more rapid. When the US intervened in June 1950, over 75% 
agreed that it was right to send troops. After the Chinese intervention, 65% of public opinion thought 
it had been a mistake. On the eve of the election of Eisenhower (October 1952) 67% were against the 
war, and by the time the truce was signed only 25% believed the war was worth fighting: H.G. 
SUMMERS Jr., Korean War Almanac, New York, Facts on File 1990, p. 216. 
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Atomic control of the peninsula can certainly however not be seen as 
stemming from symbolic considerations19. 
Other historians give evidence of the great geo-political importance 
attributed by the Truman administration to North East Asia since the end 
of the II World War. In the fall of 1945 the Americans pressed on the 
Soviets for an occupation zone in Southern Korea. Furthermore, Truman 
and the JCS asked for the control of some of the Kuriles islands, and a 
military mission to the Chinese mainland (Dalian, and some Northern 
ports). Mainland territories were considered important strategic outposts 
and Truman was compelled to give some of these up (Dalian and the 
Kuriles) and this was a qui pro quo to meet Stalin's demand for an area of 
occupation in Japan (Hokkaido). 
Recalling the setting up of postwar Allied occupation in the Far East, 
Truman remarked : "If we had had transportation and troops available, we 
would have prevented them from doing what was done in Korea and 
Manchuria, but we had no transportation ... We just didn't have the means". 
Some years later Eisenhower was heard to say, commenting on the US 
position in the Far East: "we had just given away the Kuriles, [I just don't 
understand] why in the name of God we did it. [it was the] damnest 
stupidity" 20. 
The underlined strategic interests of Washington and the above 
mentioned conflict of interests between US and USSR would have a major 
impact on the relationship between US and its allies, mainly Great Britain. 
3) The prevalence of the civil origins of the war. 
During the 1970s some revisionist historians anticipated, without 
however basing their anlaysis on solid sources, the thesis of the internal 
origin of the war. 
This thesis became popular during the 1980s. It was later proposed in a 
ponderous work by Bruce Cumings, relying on "hard" sources -
American, Chinese and Korean. Cuming's work - the most quoted history 
on the Korean War - influenced the researches of many historians. The 
main thesis he assumed, was that this war was, in fact, the outcome, and -
in a way - the continuation of a domestic revolutionary struggle whose 
origins derived from Korea's colonial history. International dynamics -
such as the Cold War with its strains between Moscow and Washington-
had little relevance in the outbreak of the war. To uphold this thesis he 
19M. PAUL, Diplomacy Delayed, in B. CUMINGS, 1983. Truman's position was a bluff. In fact, the 
main constraints on the use of atomic weapons during the war were practical and politicaL Atomic 
weapons were not readily available. When the war began, the Air Force had no planes and no crews 
capable of mounting an atomic attack. Suitable atomic targets were also lacking. And the allied 
governments, particularly that of Great Britain, opposed this course. 
2°M. GALLICCHIO, The Cold War Begins in Asia, New York, Columbia University Press 1988; M. 
GALLICCHIO, The Kuriles Controversy: US Diplomacy in the Soviet-Japan Border Dispute, 1941-
1956. PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW, summer 1991. 
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examines in his first monograph the Korean internal situation from 1945 
to 1947 and its legacies with previous XXth century history, usually 
unexplored by other western historians. 
In his second monography, in which he examines the period from 1947 
up to early 1951, he assumes that North Koreans attacked with minimal 
foreign aid and they were mostly helped by insurrectionary pro-
communist movements in the South. 
The interpretation of the revolutionary domestic origins of the war, 
however, brings Cumings to the conclusion that the Americans knew, in 
fact, of the scarce relevance of the Soviet threat. He sustains that 
Washington's goal was larger than mere intervention in Korea, that it did 
not in fact only aim to contain Soviet influence. The US intended to shape 
a new regional order for East Asia to protect American security and its 
economic interests. Thus, US's primary aim was to create a hegemonic 
power for containing revolutionary impulses in the peninsula. 
Close to the lines of this approach, John Merrill gives an accurate report 
of the little-known guerrilla conflict in 1948-1950 in South Korea. His 
work demonstrates that the guerrilla movement was much larger and 
more long-lasting than has been previously thought. 
Furthermore, Kaufman concurs with Cumings' view: "the conflict 
between North and South Korea was a true civil war and not merely a 
part of the global confrontation between Washington and Moscow". 
However, he later mitigates his judgement saying that this war was "a 
great power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union 
superimposed [italics added] on a civil war between North and South 
Korea". 
Even William Stueck, though his study is not based on Korean sources, 
or a theoretical world-systems theory, but who places a much greater 
emphasis on the international dimension of the conflict, says: "contrary 
to prevailing opinion in the US in June 1950 ... the initiative for the attack 
came from Pyongyang, not Moscow or Peking"21 
The theory of the domestic origin of the conflict is disputable, but is still 
alive in the same way as the debate on the primary influence of domestic 
and external events in the dynamics of international relations. When 
Cumings speaks of intentional politics performed by Washington, he 
comes very close to the obsolete theory of the great global conspiracy 
staged by the communists in the postwar period. 
But in a more pragmatic way, his work can be effectively used to 
counteract the statement of a completely Soviet directed North-Korean 
attack. Failing to understand the indigenous currents at the roots of the 
21B. CUMINGS, 1981 and 1990;]. MERRILL, 1989; B. K.AUFMAN, 1986, p. 32; W. STUECK, The Korean 
War as International Histoq, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, fall1986, pp. 293-94. Stueck's positions in his 
next volume seem to have developed toward a traditional international view; quoted in R. FOOT, 
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 1991, p. 414. 
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North Korean invasion, the Truman administration, almost immediately 
assumed that it had been inspired directly by Moscow and Peking as part 
of a dangerous and aggressive new worldwide push for the extension of 
Communist influence. 
As a conclusion to this paragraph, the thesis of an exclusively internal 
origin of the war is not entirely convincing when it brings to the extreme 
conclusion that korean society in the years preceding the war was in a 
kind of revolutionary situation, according to a Marxist analysis. 
Nationalism was in reality the main force, and even Korean communists 
were primarily nationalists. 
The history of Korea is the history of a colonized country, which, from 
1910 onward, struggled for de-colonization, not for revolution. Even 
today's North Korean communism has a strongly independent, national 
component. 
It seems more sound to follow the argumentation of Peter Lowe, an 
English scholar. Adopting the point of view of the Koreans themselves, 
he states that it was not a revolutionary situation, but "rather the 
continuation of a civil war that had started in 1945". Adopting a 
worldwide view he sustains that the hostilities can best be understood 
"in the light of developments .. .in China, Japan and in Europe [Italics 
added]"22 
4) Korea as a turning point for the global cold war process. 
The Korean War was often seen as of decisive importance, provoking a 
clear-cut change in the attitude of the US administration. The historians 
emphazising the strong effect caused by this external event on the 
American policy-making process generally extend this interpretation to 
Europe and to the process of the defense of the Old Continent. Was the 
Korean war crucial to the establishment of US hegemony in East-West 
relations, to US military budgets, to its relations with its major allies? 
Some scholars (Cohen, Tucker), come to Korea passing through China, 
and support revisionist arguments. They reverse the orthodox thesis 
according to which since the beginning of 1949, when China appeared to 
be lost (this was particularly evident from March-April1949 with the fall 
of most of Manchuria and the big central-China towns, including Peking), 
Washington decided to adopt a policy of clear-cut hostility toward the 
Communist directed Government (non recognition). Cohen and Tucker, 
on the contrary, stress a wide spread attitude in the administration: the 
Secretary of State, Acheson, many officials in the State Department, but 
22P. LOWE, The Origins of the Korean War, London, Longman 1986, preface. 
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mainly the economic lobbies (traders and enterpreneurs) were decisively 
m favour of a normalization with Peking, and against the policy of non-
recognition. And, they state, this would have been a productive policy, 
because there were serious possibilities that China could chose a policy 
of differentiation with the Soviet Union, and that Mao Zedong become a 
sort of "Asian Tito". As stated previously, the lack of studies on the US 
domestic political athmosphere makes it difficult to accept 
wholeheartedly the - in other way fully documented - Cohen-Tucker 
thesis. 
Truman's decision to intervene in the Korean conflict destroyed this 
possibility, and also that of a compromise course with China, while 
militarizing American foreign policy to a regrettable degree. Thus Cohen 
and Tucker see Korea as a turning point. 
Similar arguments are supported by another historian: Ernest May. If May 
seems not to believe in the pro-China lobbies his opinion is a more 
psychological one. The Korean event really was a turning point: Truman's 
decision to intervene in Korea was the result of an emotional choice 
emphasized by the need to give an answer to his critics for the loss of 
China. May stresses the thesis of a dualistic, ambiguous attitude toward 
Asia in US foreign policy (the balance between the condemnation of 
Colonialism, and the support of local colonialism) and says that an 
unexpected and external event (the outbreak of the war) made an 
impulsive reaction prevail in the US administration. In the decision 
between "calculated policy and axiomatic" both present in the US attitude 
toward East Asia before the outbreak of the war, the axiomatic, the more 
emotional, prevailed. Truman's decision to send troops to Korea was an 
instinctive reaction that expressed the national style, deeply rooted in 
American experience. For May, the Korean war had a strong "catalyzing 
effect" on the formation of the Cold War consensus. According to May 
(but also to Cohen, Tucker), the attitude of the US Administration for East 
Asia was unclear and ill-defined, whilst open towards Asian nationalism. 
Only this external act of aggression was able to push it toward the 
mihtanzatwn of containment. These authors mention in particular - to 
underlme the theory of a sharp turning point - the Acheson speech in 
January 1950 at the National Press club (supra) as a demonstration of 
compromise-oriented position of the US government taken aback by 
unforeseen events23. 
But the reality is that this speech was public, and even if it is true that it 
had a great impact on the Koreans24, these authors do not mention the 
Z3w. COHEN ed), New Frontiers in American East-Asian Relations, New York, Columbia University 
Press 1983; N.B. TUCKER, Pattern in the Dust, New York, Columbia University Press 1983; E. MAY 
;~d ].C. THOMSON Jr, Amer~can East Asian Relations, New York, Oxford University Press, 1972. 
see R. FOOT, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, footnote n. 10 that gives details of various studies produced 
in South Korea in recent years. They document the preoccupation of South koreans about Acheson's 
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domestic and secret process that had been going on in the American 
bureaucracy smce JUne 1949, initiated by the Defense Department. 
Gaddis also emphasizes the turning point character of the event. He takes 
May, Tucker, and Cohen's interpretations to the extreme, stressing the 
hberal attitude of Washmgton and pointing to the Korean War as the start 
of .militarization in. American policy. He relates to the accomodating 
attitude the US pohcy makers had prior to the Korean War. Truman, 
Marshall, and Acheson, had they been allowed to run their course, might 
have formed policies which would have resulted in the evolution of a 
multipolar world, operating on the balance of power game principles25. 
Another supporter of the turning point thesis is James Matray. He says 
that If prevwusly most scholars have agreed that the Truman Doctrine 
marked the crucial turning point in postwar American foreign policy, it 
can be said that the Korean War marked the emergence of US unlimited 
commi.ttment to defend the world from the threat of Soviet domination. 
Gaddis in 1974 said that at that time evidence existed to "suggest that 
historians in search of turning points in American diplomatic history 
might more prof1tably concentrate their attention on the events of 1950 
than on the famous 15 weeks of 1947"26 
Looking at the present sources, has been documented enough material to 
define obsolete also the turning point thesis. According, for instance, to 
Cuming's recent work 0990), we can easily verify an American 
"awareness of crisis" similar to that faced in 1947. Three points were at 
the origin of it were: 1) the possible failure of the Marshall Plan for 
Western Europe, 2) the already certain victory of Mao Zedong in China 
dunng the second half of 1949, 3) the explosion of the first USSR A 
nuclear device in August 194927. 
On the 25th of April 1950, Truman had already accepted the basic 
principles of a global document (NSC 68) which sanctioned the 
militarization of containment28 Although the intention of this essay is not 
to examine this document, we can compare it to a regional one (NSC 48) 
prepared for East Asia in the same period. 
January 1950 speech to place Korea outside the "defense perimeter". At the same time, North koreans 
had the impression that the Americans had placed South korea within the defense perimeter: see the 
traditiOnal Northern interpretation in The US Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang, 
1977) and B. CUMINGS's second volume. 
25J.L. GADDIS, La politica degli Stati Uniti verso la Corea, in Elena Aga Rossi a cura di) G/i Stati 
Uniti e l'origine della Guerra Fredda, Bologna, I1 Mulino 1984. 
26].!. MA TRAY, 1985; I.L. GADDIS, Was The Truman Doctrine a real Turning Point?, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS January 1974, 386-408. On this line also L.S. KAFLAN. The United States and NATO the 
Formative Years, Lexington KJ, 1985 and R. JERVIS The Imp;ct of the Korean \Var on the Cold War, 
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, December 1980, p. 563. 
27'B. CUMINGS, 1983, introduction. 
ZS:w. LOTH Die Teilung der Welt, 1941-1955, Munchen, DTV, 1980, p. 246. On the genesis of the 
NSC 68, see P.Y. YAMMOND, NSC68: Prologue to Rearmement, in SCHILLING HAMMOND and 
SNYER, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, New York 1962. 
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As well as for the global concern, for Asia the decision to militarize the 
containment was taken well before the outbreak of the Korean War. The 
sending of military aid to the Asia was under way before the outbreack of 
the war. 
In East Asia the change of directive driving away from the milder 
concept of the political containment, had started from the adoption of the 
reverse course in Japan, and the failure of bi-lateral negotiation for Korea 
in 1947, and continued throughout 1948 and 1949. 
The "loss of China" accelerated a more rigid position by US 
administration, leading to the start of the militarization of the Asian 
regional leading document (NSC 48). The main crucial event quoted here 
was complementary to other nationalist, pro-communist subversions 
(Burma, Malaysia, Indochina) that contributed to a change from a more 
pro-nationalist attitude to an anti-communist one. 
The chances for US recognition of Mao's regime were very poor even 
after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 
1949, and were virtually nil by the spring of 1950, prior to the outbreak 
of the war. 
Acheson himself (who has been very critical of the American policy in 
China) never accepted wholeheartedly the "Asian-Tito" theory, and was 
thus not in favour of a quick adjustement with Communist China. He 
always maintained however an ambivalent attitude towards a possible 
Sino-Soviet split. 
The option for equivalence between Asian and Soviet Communism was 
vigorously stressed by several power centres within the Truman 
administration: they urged direct military support for East Asia and for 
keeping an independent state in Taiwan and the defense perimeter 
represented by Japan, Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, 
etc .. 
From June 1949 onward the American administration, instigated by the 
Department of defense, started a policy of harsher treatment for Asia. 
The Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, had asked for a NSC 
resolution, "increasingly concerned at the course of events in Asia". 
Initially, the State Department, taking a milder position than the Pentagon, 
tried to control the making of the Asian NSC paper, and forwarded a 
study (PPS 51, march 1949) in which nationalist movements in East Asia 
were considered genuine, and the US support to French "imperialism" in 
Indochina regrettable. 
The version of December 1949 (NSC 48), on the contrary, declared that it 
was essential for the US to react to the victory of communism in China 
seen as a "grievous political defeat", and warned of the effect of the 
"domino reaction" in South East Asia. Even harsher words were added 
by the JCS for the final version, approved by Truman, on December 30, 
1949. "The situation in Asia has developed to the point where concrete 
action is required". The Pentagon asked for the beginning of military 
12 
help to Asian countries (NSC 48/2)29. Truman started the implementation 
of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) "for the general area of China" 
C$75 millions). Military aid was sent in March to Thailand, in April to 
Burma, in May to the French for Indochina. By 13 January 1950 the 
Korean Aid Bill ($60 millions for the second fiscal semester) had been 
passed. 
After the outbreak of the Korean war and after the first months of 
military reversal, the already existing trends for the liberation of the 
northern part of the peninsula (MacArthur, the JCS, John K. Emmerson 
[North East Asia (NEA) Division, Department of state], Dulles 
[Ambassador at Large], Allison [director, NEA, Department of State]), 
coalesced in a new position which was very close to the future strategy 
of roll back. The administration passed in September 1950 a NSC 
document (NSC 81) that allowed US/UN troops to go north of the 38th 
parallel in a posture that should be "one of liberation rather than 
retaliation". The May 1951 NSC pronouncement (NSC 48/5) was in favour 
of a negotiated end of the war, but not of the reconstruction of the status 
quo ante, as previously stated. Korea had to be united and non-
communist30. 
A following NSC document (NSC 118/2, December 1951) incorporated a 
militarist study of the Pentagon in case of failure of the stalling 
negotiations. In spite of direct official reference to Limited War, this 
policy was never entirely adopted. In the US administration (as Rosemary 
Foot has fully demonstrated 31 ), the debate about widening the war 
continued to rage long after MacArthur was recalled. 
In early summer 1951, for example, Dean Rusk, Acheson's assistant for 
Far eastern affairs, when recommending stronger measures against China 
and a bolder policy for Korea, said: "The Peiping regime may be a 
colonial Russian government- a Slavic Manchukuo on a large scale ... It is 
not the government of China. It is not Chinese". However in agreement 
with this were also General Marshall Secretary of Defense, US permanent 
Ambassador to the UN Warren Austin, John Foster Dulles, Ambassador at 
large, charged for the negotiation for the Japanese Peace Treaty32 
This trend was even more accentuated in winter-spring 1953 with Dulles 
as Secretary of State (see, for example, NSC 139th meeting, April 8, 
1953)33 
29A.J.ROTTER The Path to Vietnam, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987, pp 120-124. 
3°:R.M. BLUM, Drawing the Line, New York, Northon 1983. R. FOOT, 1985, Ch.s 3-4-5, B. CUMINGS, 
1983, introduction. 
31R. FOOT, 1985; G.A. CAMP ANA, L'armistizio di Corea, STORIA DELLE RELAZIONI 
INTERNAZIONALI, 1986/1, p. 110. 
32R. FOOT, 1985, p 140. 
33 Ibid., 1985, p 210 
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It seems more sound, in conclusion, to take a different view of the 
meaning of the Korean conflict, arguing that it accelerated th~ 
militarization of containment, and- in doing so- the Cold War, but that 1t 
was not pivotal34. The korean hostilities simply highlighted a trend 
already well under way in US policy circles, that would have been 
developed even if the Korean war had not been started., 
The historiographical problem of ending hostilities. The 
Unpopularity of the war, and the pressures from Asian and 
European Allies 
This is the most intriguing part of the recent historiography, to which 
few researchers have added and which has been strangely neglected. My 
own work has broadened certain aspects of British participation to the 
war and of the interactions with European politics. 
Important works detail the Australian and. Canadian perspectives. 
However close their relationship with the Umted States was, d1fferent 
perceptions still existed. Australia, for example, had important priorities 
to safeguard, and - following the British leadership -, tried to defend 
itself from the possible threats from Middle East and Malaya. She was also 
concerned with the making of a security treaty with the United States, 
and with the conclusion of a safe Japanese peace treaty. We must also 
recall that other allied powers plaied also a very important role in 
bringing the conflict to an end. India, for example, - on the eve of the 
non-aligned movement - played a decisive role in keeping the contacts 
between Peking and the western capitals alive35. 
We will not quote here the French position - which sent military and 
naval forces to Korea. Her diplomatic attitude towards US policy was 
never critical since Paris at the time was highly dependent on US aid for 
Indochina where she was engaged in a desperate struggle with Vietminh 
insurgents led by Ho Chi Minh, and to some degree this military support 
was a quid pro quo. 
The South korean dictator, Syngman Rhee accepted the armistice only 
when he was certain of a security treaty with the US and $3 billion in his 
bag. The direct Japanese involvement in the war - by then denied, today 
proved - made the last part of the conflict less moral and caused the 
34w. LAFEBER, NATO and the Korean War: a Context, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Fall 1989, p. 461-73; 
M.P. LEFFLER The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, April1984. Similar positions held by G.H. CHANG, Friends and 
Enemy: China United States and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, Standford, Standford University 
Press 1990; A.J. Rotter, 1987. 
35G.A. CAMP ANA 1988; R. O'NEILL Australia in the Korean War, Canberra, Australian War 
Memorial and Australian Gvt Publishing Service 1981; D. STAIRS The Diplomacy of Constraint, 
Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1974; S. DAYAL, India's Role in the Korean War, Delhi, S. Chand 
and Co. 1959. 
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Americans to devote much attention not only to the demands of the 
adversary, but also to the proposals of their friends, that is taking in 
account the moderate position of the most politically influential ally: 
Great Britain.36 
The reflections of the last part of this essay will move out from the 
British opposition to the 1951-53 prolongation of the war. But before 
coming to the core of our thesis we will identify the causes of US-British 
friction since the intervention. 
1)Approval of US intervention, modification of US declaration, Bevin 's 
attitude, delay in sending troops. 
Approval by the Cabinet of US intervention was given, but only after 
severe criticism by the Foreign Office. Kenneth Younger- then Foreign 
Secretary ad interim on account of the illness of Ernest Bevin - noted 
that the US intervention was dangerous and aimed at hampering the 
Communist Chinese from landing on Formosa. This was a sensitive topic: 
if the war was extended, India and Pakistan would intervene to defend 
the newly born PRC. And this would cause a crisis of conscience for 
London. The danger represented to continuing cohesion with the other 
Commonwealth nations was underlined by another experienced 
diplomat, Bill Dening. 
From his bed at the hospital, even Bevin noted the danger of involving 
Formosa. Each of these comments were based on the defence of British 
trade in China and in particular the pivotal role of Hong Kong. Later, 
Bevin would deny his initial support of the decision to go to Korea: this -
he said - was a blunder made only by Attlee. However the Prime 
Minister, Attlee, obtained the approval of the Cabinet, thus giving full 
support to US intervention. The opposition in the Cabinet succeeded in 
making \'V"ashington erase from the public statement that the attack was 
conducted by "the centrally directed communist imperialism", which was 
regarded as "ham fisted"37. 
Regarding military help, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) were initially 
against sending land troops, fearing for other British outposts like Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, and Middle East (Iran)38. But the American pressures and 
more economic aid for the defense programs in Europe helped to make a 
decision that was basically political. 
2)Proposed buffer zone in Korea. 
The danger of a widening of the hostilities to China (PRC), and the 
possibly unfortunate consequences for Great Britain became even more 
real when, in October, US forces trespassed the 38th parallel. At the same 
time, Tibet, whose international status had been regulated in 1914 with 
the mediation and the eo-responsibility of Britain, was occupied by the 
36R. FOOT, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, pp. 422, 423. 
37G.A. CAMP ANA, 1988, pp 70-73 
38Jbid., pp. 73-75 
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forces of a "strongly materialistic" - as Lhasa commented - Communist 
state: China. 
The British COS proposed to send north to the 38th parallel only south 
koreansin order to avoid eventual complications in the East-Asian area. 
The US response was negative. 
In November, when the chinese intervention in Korea was made reality, 
the British military summit proposed a (de facto) de-militarized North 
Korea. Though not being a definitive solution for the war, the Chinese 
would have accepted this proposal as a base for negotiation. Thisproject 
was boycotted by the US Pentagon without being seriously considered 
by the State Department39. 
3) Summit in December 1950 
The failure of the US/UN offensive (the home for Christmas attack) 
after the Chinese intervention caused some incontrolled reactions in the 
US political world, and Truman hinted at the possible use of the atomic 
device against China. 
MacArthur was proposing the withdrawal of all the forces from Korea to 
Japan and the bombing of Manchuria from there. The British Chiefs of 
Staff were terrified by the resemblance of this option to an "asian 
Dunquerque", and the European allies sponsored a summit requested by 
the British Cabinet with the Americans in December. In particular, the 
French were disturbed by the possible result of a wide spread war in the 
Far East, which would result in the necessity for an immediate rebuilding 
of a West-German army. For the British the war with China meant a 
worse defense position in the Middle East and in Europe. 
For London the goal of the Washington meeting was political: "localize 
and solve" the conflict. 
If there was no result in moderating the Americans on the use of the 
Atomic device- Washington refused to agree on any kind of inter-allied 
pact -, the British did apparently succeed in restraining Washinghton 
from an all-out war with Peking. The Americans were impressed by the 
British argument that a intervention in China would surely provoke the 
implementation of the March 1950 USSR/RPC pact and thus result in a 
general war. The US/UN troops would simply have to "say good bye" in 
such a case. 
The British proposed the restitution of Taiwan and a seat at the UN to the 
PRC as a quid pro quo to start negotiations. Although this was not 
accepted, the word "negotiation" came finally into the US lexicon. 
Last but not least, the summit served as a reinforcement of the formal 
engagement taken in the month of December by the new Strategic 
Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) director Eisenhower: the 
US would defend Europe "from the first day" in case of Communist 
attack, and before the creation of a West German Army. This was oxygen 
39Jbid., pp. 181-172 
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for the British economic contingence: after a short period of amelioration 
from the outbreak of the war, the extra-defense expenditure was 
seriously damaging the balance of payments, without the renewal of any 
kind of formal aid engagement by the Americans40. 
4) Pressure by British public opinion, by the Commonwealth conference, 
by the left in the Cabinet. . . . 
Intellectuals Pro-Chinese lobbies - that in Great Bntam, unlike the US 
pro-nationallst China Lobby, were against the war - and India asked 
Washington for moderation in the Commonwealth Conference. . 
In January the Cabinet revealed its strong resistance to the condemnat10n 
of China as an aggressor, although this was requested and ob tamed by 
the US in the UN. Some leftist ministers such as Gaitskell, Bevan, Strachey 
and high officials (Younger, Strang) expressed for different reasons their 
opposition to further measures against China, and succeeded m 
modifying the policy of the Cabinet 41. 
5) Non-repatriation policy and the Foreign Office. . . 
Despite much discussion, it is still not clear if the Bntlsh stance had some 
influence on the dismissal of MacArthur. It IS however certam that the 
opening of the negotiations in Korea (July 1951) made the British ruling 
class hope for a quick end to host1hties. \X!hen 1t became clear that th1s 
would not occur, the Foreign Office was shocked. The new Conservative 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, had to face a techmcal 
problem that could easily lead to the failure of the negotiations: the non-
repatriation issue of the prisoners of war (POW). To guarantee the nght 
of free choice the Americans decided to ask for an amendment of the 
International law (Geneva 1949). 
Many of the prisoners in US/UN hands did not want to be repatriated to 
a Communist country (North Korea or People's Repubhc of Chma). This 
humanitarian principle was also accepted by the British. However Eden's 
position was tentative, together with that of the majority of the Fore1gn 
Office. Only the strong anti-communist stance of the Pnme Mm1ster, 
Churchill, accepted in toto the American position in April 195242. 
6) Anglo-Indian initiative and the "de facto" move of the negotiations 
to the VII UN General Assembly. 
The position of the British diplomacy did not change very much under 
conservative rule. The war in Korea had to be stopped at the earhest 
opportunity, and the best opportunity was represented by th~ diplomatic 
relationship that London had w1th India, a former Dommwn. Even 1f 
often defined "shifty and tricky", diplomats hke Pan1kkar (later 
40Ibid., pp. 191-203 
41 Ibid., pp. 220-233. 
42Jbid., pp. 306-310. 
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Raghavan) in Peking and Menon in London had a pivotal role in keeping 
alive the contacts between London and the Communist China. 
In the middle of May, 1952, The Foreign Office found out that the 
Chinese were in favour of a solution for the prisoner issue which would 
consent "saving their face". No actual coincidence can be proved but the 
bombing of the Suhio dams on the 23th of July - decided by the Pentagon 
- caused the Chinese position to rigidify and this diplomatic demarche 
therefore failed. One author (Foot) has compared this event to the failure 
of the negotiating operation "Marigold" in Vietnam (1965), scuppered as 
US jet bombers attacked the Hanoi area43. 
The real success of the British diplomacy however was reached in 
November, when the Korean issue - which became more political than 
technical - were brought to the VII UN General Assembly. The 
divergence with the Americans relating to the ending of the war reached 
its nadir44. 
7)The problem of nuclear blackmail and Churchill's position after 
Rhee's ultimate reluctance. 
This is the most intriguing problem of recent historiography, a problem 
to which British scholars have added fresher interpretations. For a long 
time American historians (La Feber, Hoopes, Adams, Eisenhower himself 
in his memoirs) have maintained that the war was ended by Eisenhower's 
strategy to threaten the use of atomic weapons, thus forcing the Chinese 
to accept a compromise on the POW question. Dulles added points to that 
thesis, reporting that he had conveyed the possible use of the atomic 
device to Peking through N ehru in May 1953. Some historians have 
recently confirmed this view ( Gaddis, Ambrose), saying that 
Eisenhower's stance was a calculated one, and that he would never have 
used such a weapon for Korea. They base their statement on the 20 May 
NSC meeting in which Eisenhower accepted the possible use of such a 
weapon, if the negotiations were to break down. 
The eventuality that the Americans would have used the atom bomb is 
highly questionable as the before-mentioned NSC meeting took only 
place after the Chinese had shown clearly that they would take part in a 
negotiated solution. This solution- and Eisenhower knew it- was moving 
along precisely those lines established in the Indian compromise. Stalin's 
death had changed the Chinese's mind dramatically, and they were eager 
to stop a dangerous and costly war. The new situation was due to a 
changed relation between the Chinese and the Soviets, as well as to the 
revival of the Anglo-Indian mediation on the POW problem45. 
43Jbid., pp. 310-325, R .. FOOT, 1990 p.214. 
44G.A. CAMP ANA, pp. 331-348. 
45w. LAFEBER, America, Russia and the Cold War, New York 1967; T. HOOPES, The Devil and John 
Foster Dulles, Boston, Little Brown 1973; S. ADAMS, Firsthand Report, London Hutchinson 1962; D. 
EISENHOWER, The White House, Years Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1963. More cautious,].L. 
GADDIS The Unespected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism and the Russians, in 
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John Kotch also argues convincingly, demonstrating how the major 
problem for the Eisenhower administration in the last few months of the 
war was not the question of performing of a nuclear policy, but that of 
how to force the South .Korean dictator (Syngman Rhee) to accept the 
idea of an armistice. A coup d'etatwas prepared against him, though not 
enacted. Churchill, even the most pro-american in the British Cabinet, 
cabled directly to Eisenhower, proposing to dismiss Syngman Rhee or 
even arrest him46 
An evaluation of the British Role in East Asia. The legacies of the 
Korean War and the ethic of the "three interlocking circles". 
The British already had a controversial record with the Americans in East 
Asia, the geographical area in which the Special Relationship worked 
less effectively. The major problem was the integration of China in 
postwar East Asian economic order and its relations with Japan. London, 
giving its diplomatic recognition to Peking in January 1950, did not 
communicate to the Americans all its opposition to the US policy of non-
recognition. The attitude of British towards China can be summarized 
with Churchill's word: 
"I do not regard Communist China as a formidable adversary .. .for the 
next four of five years 400 million Chinese will be living just where they 
are now. They cannot swim, they are not much good at flying and the 
Trans-Siberian railway is already overloaded"47 
London had already demonstrated her opposition to a Pax Americana in 
1945 when it did not accept participation in an American proposed 
consultary commission (Far Eastern Advisory Commission - FEAC -) 
similar to the one proposed for Europe in 1943 (European Advisory 
Commission- EAC -).Later it became possible to reach a compromise 
(Moscow, December 1945), but the result of this compromise (Far 
Eastern Commission - FEC - and Allied Council for Japan - ACJ - did not 
in fact work. 
R.A. IMMERMAN ed) John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press 1990; see also S. AMBROSE, Eisenhower: the President, New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 1984. For a documentary reference: Memo of Discussion, 145th meeting of the NSC, 
20/5/53, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (FRUS), XV, vol. 1, pp. 1064-1068. For a 
fresher view, see: R. FOOT, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY,pp. 425-426, M.A.RYAN, New York, M.E. SHARPE, 
!ne: 1989 chapter VII. 
46J. KOTCH, The Origins of the American Committment to Korea, in B. CUMINGS, 1983; G.A. 
CAMP ANA, 1988, p. 387. 
47Prime Minister Minute, 26/8/52, Public Record Office (PRO) Foreign Office (F0)371/99584. 
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The control of occupied Japan and South Korea was entirely in the hands 
of the SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers: i.e. General Douglas 
MacArthur). 
Britain decided not to show its dissent to US policy in North East Asia, 
especially after 1947, in order to obtain US economic help for Europe 
and South East Asia, given that this aid would be closely connected w1th 
the management of her own economic crisis48. 
American assistance was made concrete through purchases of Malayan 
rubber and tin necessary for the recovery of the British dollar gap. US 
aid started by the fall of 1949. The main reason for US support to British 
and French colonialist positions in South East Asia was the wish to 
alleviate the reservations of these countries towards fostering the 
integration of Germany into the western defense system.. . . 
The British decided, in order to preserve the US ass1stence pohcy m 
South East Asia, not to communicate to them their complete dissent about 
US policy in Korea and Japan. The British conclusions about the relations 
with US, censored and not sent to US were: 
"In the Far East our main problem lies not with the inhabitants or 
Governements of the area, but with the United States whose policies we 
must endeavour to influence along lines acceptable to ourselves"49. 
This line of conduct was successful regarding Malaysia, and this 
diminished the dollar gap, but the British had little influence on the 
situation in Japan and in China. 
London's conduct during the Korean war compelled Washington to 
accept the status quo in North East Asia - and in doing this it was very 
successful - but the effects of the Korean war were on the whole 
negative. From a strategic point of view, the British had to cede to 
Americans all its influence on Japanese policies, and more generally 
those of the North East Asian scenario. 
In economic matters the British continued to worry about Japanese 
economic competition in South East Asia, and were forced to compete 
with their allies for increasingly expensive Far Eastern raw materials. 
Finally, due to US demand and without sufficient US economic help for 
the rearmament program50, they diverted resources- through NATO-
from the pressing business of economic recovery for the acceleration 
and expansion of the Western European re-armament programs. 
48A. ROTTER, 1987 and, for example, see CAB, CP(49) 175, 23/8/49. 
49Permanent Under SeGTetaiy Commission (PUSC)53, 30/8/49 Regional Co-operation in South-East 
Asia and the Far East, PRO F0371/76385. 
50c. C. PEDEN, The Economic Implications of the UK's Roles in World Affairs in the 1950', Paper 
given at the EUI, 25/10/91. p. 15. 
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After the Korean War, the framework in which British Governments 
were moving faltered. Not one of the celebrated Three Interlocking 
Circles intersecting in London, and symbolizing the pride of the Imperial 
Great Britain, were completely healthy. The British/Commonwealth one 
was deeply influenced by the economic crisis, while the sterling area 
was reduced. The American Special Relationship did not always work as 
is demonstrated in this essay. In Europe- the third circle- Britain had to 
accept - during the war in the Far East, and probably mostly because of 
this - West Germany within the western fold, despite the serious fears 
that remained about German economic, and indeed military, 
competitiveness51. 
51M. PETER, Britain, the Cold War and the Economics of German Rearmament, 1949-51., in A. 
DEIGHTOK ed) 1990. 
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